The disruptive technology of blockchain can deliver secure solutions without the need for a central authority. In blockchain, assets that belong to a participant are controlled through the private key of an asymmetric key pair that is owned by the participant. Although, this lets blockchain network participants to have sovereignty on their assets, it comes with the responsibility of managing their own keys. Currently, there exists two major bottlenecks in managing keys; a) users don't have an efficient and secure way to store their keys, b) no efficient recovery mechanism exists in case the keys are lost. In this study, we propose secure methods to efficiently store and recover keys. For the first, we introduce an efficient encryption mechanism to securely encrypt and decrypt the private key using the owner's biometric signature. For the later, we introduce an efficient recovery mechanism using biometrics and secret sharing scheme. By applying the proposed key encryption and recovery mechanism, asset owners are able to securely store their keys on their devices and recover the keys in case they are lost.
Introduction
In a blockchain network, trust is embedded in the network itself. Therefore, blockchain reduces the cost of "trust" by eliminating the third parties traditionally needed for providing trust. This is achieved through the cryptographic linking structure of the blocks, distribution of the ledger and a consensus algorithm. Many initiatives exist aiming to replace centralized solutions with blockchain based decentralized solutions. As a result, when centralized authorities are removed as the provider of "trust", individuals have more sovereignty on their assets while cost associated with trust is reduced. However this imposes more responsibility on the network participants on managing their own keys.
Asymmetric keys play a vital role in identifying network participants and controlling the assets in a blockchain network. An asymmetric key pair consists of a public key which can be shared with anyone and a corresponding private key which must be stored hidden. In blockchain, an asymmetric key pair is assigned to a network participant, and participants are identified by the public key of the asymmetric key pair, while assets ownership and transfers are managed through self-controlling of the private key.
Despite the ever-growing adoption of the blockchain technology, major problems persist in storing and recovering private keys, which have negative impact on usability of the blockchain technology, and the security of assets in the network. Traditional private key storing mechanism includes key memorization, cold storage, keeping the key digitally in plain form, keeping the key remotely through a wallet provider, and keeping the key in a symmetrically encrypted digital wallet. Memorization is challenging as the private keys are too long for humans to memorize. For instance, in Bitcoin system, private keys' length are 256 bits in hexadecimal which can be represented in 64 characters in the range 0-9 or A-F. Cold storage is as secure as the physical material where the private key is stored on, and has inefficiencies in terms of usability as the key retrieval is challenging from the cold storage. While digital key keeping in plain form has more usability, it is the least secure option as the digital devices could be open and susceptible to hacking and security breaches.
Wallets are usually responsible for the process of private and public key pair creation. In web wallet services, private keys that belong to the clients are encrypted and kept on related server machines. Web wallets provide users to control their assets from any web browser or mobile platforms. Despite the usability advantages, storing the key remotely through a digital wallet provider is a centralized solution, and is only as secure as the remote party which you trust your private keys with. In desktop wallets like Electrum [1] , each user locally keep their private key with the encryption option. Regular symmetrically encrypted digital wallets provide more security. However, the user must remember the password used in the encryption for the key retrieval. If forgotten, it would be impossible to retrieve the private key.
As a matter of the fact, it is crucial to move away from traditional key storage mechanisms towards a more user-friendly and secure key storage approach, which incorporates the biometrics of the key owner along with a distributed key recovery mechanism. This paper focuses on secure and user-friendly storage of private keys, and keys recovery methods. Section 2 briefly describes blockchain technology, specifically concentrating the usage of keys and describes what key owners' control by securely managing their keys, and what is compromised if the keys are lost. In section 3, we describe our solution. In section 4, we review the existing work in the domain, and we follow by conclusion.
Blockchain Overview
World met blockchain with bitcoin which is popular for its proven solid functionality of decentralized peer-to-peer digital asset transfer [2] . Blockchain protocol gets its form with blocks which are chained with hashes. This chain of blocks structure provides tamper-proofness and doesn't permit any change on historical records. On the other hand, each block consist of transactions and some unique information about the block. In this section, we emphasize the key points of blockchain protocols.
Transactions and Blocks
Transactions are asset transfers in a blockchain network. Depending on the protocol, transactions may contain any kind of assets such as a financial value, health data, log record, identity information etc. Blocks are bundle of transactions. With these transactions, there are some more block specific information in each block like the number of the block, previous block's hash, transactions' merkle root [3] , a timestamp and a nonce value.
Chained blocks include cryptographic chain mechanism which uses hash functions. Every block has a hash output of previous block in the ledger. Hash functions are deterministic and one way functions which always generates the same output value for the same input. When hash function outputs are very characteristic and unique for any input, they also does not contain any meaningful information about the inputs. For each different input, hash functions generate a completely different output, being very strict against any disparity.
Hash outputs can be assumed as abstract or fingerprint of a piece of information. In a chain of blocks, every block header includes hash value of the previous block, constituting a chain of blocks. This mechanism provides immutability of the data stored in the ledger. When data in a block changes, the block hash also changes. Consequently, the next block's hash output also change in the chain. If any data changes in block number a, the chain is broken after block a as it can be seen in Figure 1. 
Public and Private Keys in Blockchain
In blockchain protocols, public keys are commonly used as address, account number, id etc. Therefore, naturally it can be shared with other users in the ecosystem. Private keys are used for signing transactions by its owner [4] . In common, a participant's asset balance means the value of assets which can be signed and used as input in transactions by the participant. As it's described in Satoshi's bitcoin white paper [2] , when a client sends a coin to another one, the owner actually does not send any asset to anyone. Instead sending a digital coin, the wallet reassigns an amount of coin and declares to the network that to create and assign new coins to the receiver. In order to reassign, each transaction is signed by transaction owner's private key and is verified using owner's public key. Figure 2 shows transaction verifications in bitcoin transaction scheme. In public-permissionless blockchains like bitcoin, transactions are declared publicly. 
What is Managed with Private Key
In financial applications like bitcoin or ripple, users sign their transactions with private keys. Each coin (asset) in transactions has a public key on it. Since private key is associated with public key, private key holder is the owner of the coin. Similarly in health care projects, people manage their sensitive health information. In decentralized digital identity projects, sensitive identity information is managed. In supply chain projects asset owners manage critical tracking records, and in real estate projects ownership of real estate properties is managed. Since various kind of assets are bound up with private keys in blockchain projects, the safety of keys is vital. In any case of key compromise, the attacker will be able to spend money or reach/share/sell sensitive information, or create fraudulent records, or own and take the initiative of private properties. The possible compromise scenarios and their possible consequences force blockchain developers to build more secure key preservation and more secure protocols.
Transaction
Transactions are basic units or atomic events of blockchain protocols. Blockchain protocols usually has their own type of assets, which are transferred through transactions. As an example in bitcoin system, transactions include coin transfers, while in sovrin [5] , verifiable credentials and identity management information are processed through transactions. Since transactions are atomic events of blockchain applications, the ownership of transaction is critically important. In each transaction, depending on protocol's transaction architecture, there is one or more addresses as related to user endpoint. These addresses are generally public keys of users. Public key or its derivatives are used as address or endpoint. In blockchain applications, personal information is never used to provide anonymity. As an example, there must be at least two public keys in a normal bitcoin transaction to manifest the transaction which is processed between two users.
Since there is no central authority, each user is responsible for creation of their own transactions. A transaction is firstly created by the owner within validation rules. This transaction will later be checked by protocol's authorized nodes and will be processed if valid.
In Figure 3 , a basic transaction between two users is shown. As seen in the figure, the transaction is between 04f246181692c7ffd0... and 048370bfcc36bef0b6... addresses. Each address represents a real world user without revealing any personal information. Therefore, transactions are generally transparent in blockchain protocols. When a transaction is generated, it must also be digitally signed by its owner. Transactions transparency only can be handled with user anonymity and digital signatures.
Digital Signatures
Digital signatures are mathematical techniques that verify authenticity and ensure integrity of digital contents [6] . A valid digital signature shows that the content is original as sent, and the sender is known. These features basically points out authentication and integrity issues. In Figure 4 , it can be seen that if a user needs to digitally sign a document, private key will be enough to sign data. On the other side, in order to verify data authenticity or integrity, the user only needs digitally signed data with signature and signer's public key. From this point of view, a transaction owner will just sign the transaction using its secret private key. Then other users are able to verify the owner and integrity of transaction by using just public key of the sender of transaction. That's why public keys can be shared explicitly between users and private keys should be kept hidden and safe.
In blockchain protocol applications, generally elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) [7] or similar algorithms are used to create public and private key pair set. Assets must be related with owner's public key which represent the owner digitally and anonymously in DLT environment. Also transactions must be digitally signed before it was published to network. Digital signatures provide two substances in blockchain protocols:
• everyone is able to verify transaction sender and transaction integrity, and
• sender is not able to deny the transaction.
Methodology
In general, there are three different approaches for keeping security of holding private keys for users. In the first approach, adding additional security layer to reach the private keys stored on the device. To open a private key, biometric authentication is used. In the second approach, stored private keys are also encrypted with the biometric data. Instead of encrypting machine holding security keys, the encryption of the private keys is performed. In the last approach, private keys are generated by implementing biometric data into known prominent cryptography algorithms including DES, RSA. In this study, we use second approach for private key encryption, and we utilize a distributed key recovery mechanism for private key recovery.
Encryption and Decryption of Private Keys Using Fingerprint
Symmetric encryption and decryption is straightforward using conventional symmetric encryption methods such as Data Encryption Standard (DES), in which encryption and decryption is done using the same and a single key. In our approach, we use symmetric encryption to encrypt and decrypt private keys, and we automatically generate the key used in symmetric encryption using owner's fingerprint. Fingerprints, as a biometric trait, is unique and offers usability advantages over traditionally selected pass codes. However, certain concerns regarding privacy, security, and applicability have to be dealt with when using fingerprints.
In fingerprint systems, there exists two main phases: registration and matching. Registration step includes registering the original fingerprint image, while matching step includes matching the candidate fingerprint image against the registered image. In both phases, the fingerprint image is preprocessed, transformed, and hashed. Since it is probabilistically hard for two fingerprints taken at different times to have the same hash value (even if they match), an efficient error correction mechanism is utilized.
Preprocessing
Preprocessing includes image enhancement (filtering, binarization and thinning), minutiae points extraction, core points detection, and minutiae alignment according to the core points. Purpose of enhancement step is to compensate for scratches and noises, and end up with a binary fingerprint image to accurately detect its structure. We apply Gabor filter [8] method, in which each pixel is filtered according to estimated ridge frequency and ridge orientation. Enhancement step is proceeded with binarization using a threshold variable, and thinned that fixes the ridge lines width to one pixel.
The minutiae detection algorithm traverses the enhanced image to detect whether a pixel represents a minutiae by checking its surrounding 8-neighboring pixels. If the pixel is on a ridge and has 1 neighboring ridge pixel then the pixel represents a ridge ending type of minutiae, on the other hand, if the pixel is on a ridge and has 3 neighboring ridge pixel then the pixel represents a bifurcation type of minutiae.
Core points' position and orientation is needed in order to reliably align the minutiae points with respect to these points as reference. The core points (poincare index) of a fingerprint are special pixels that represents the centers. Loop, delta and whorl are types of core points. We use fingerprint core detection method suggested by Kawagoe et. al. [9] , which divides the image into sub-regions, obtains direction patterns and computes core points over a closed curve. For a pixel(x, y), it sums the difference between adjacent local ridge orientation angles in its 8-neighborhood. Based on the result of the calculation with a small threshold:
• (x, y) is not a core point if result is 0,
• (x, y) represents a whorl type core point if result is 2π,
• (x, y) represents a loop type core point if result is π, and
• (x, y) represents a delta type core point if result is −π.
In the minutiae alignment step, each minutiae point is rotated using the rotation of axes in two dimensions. A minutiae point (x, y) is rotated counterclockwise with respect to a core point (cx, cy) with an orientation angle θ using the matrix multiplication as below:
Cartesian Transformation
An efficient implementation of a biometric system needs to be revocable, since revocability is a must have feature for password systems for privacy and security purposes. Fingerprints as a biometric signature are permanently associated with the owner, and if stolen, all systems previously used with the fingerprint signature are in danger. Therefore, we apply cartesian transformation to transform the minutiae points using a one-way, irreversible function to make the fingerprint system cancellable. Instead of storing the original fingerprint image, we store the transformed version along with the transformation parameters.
In cartesian block transformation, the 2D coordinate system on which the minutiae points are represented is divided into blocks of regular size. Initially, minutiae points are placed in the blocks based on their locality, such that closer minutiae points are placed in the same or neighboring blocks. Later, the transformation is achieved by shuffling the blocks using matrix multiplication, and arranging minutiae points based on the new block locations.
In our implementation, 2D coordinate system is divided into a HxW size of blocks. Initial cartesian blocks are numbered from 1 to |HxW | which is represented by a matrix C of size 1x|HxW |, and a transformation matrix M of size |HxW |x|HxW | is randomly generated having values of either 0 or 1. As an example, let H = 2 and W = 2, then C = [1, 2, 3, 4] . Then the matrix multiplication with the randomly generated matrix of M is shown below: In the registration phase, instead of saving minutiae points' original locations, their transformed locations are saved along with the transformation parameters. The transformation parameters include the boundaries of the original fingerprint image and the transformation matrix. It is important to note that, the original cartesian block for a given minutiae point is not saved during the registration phase. However, during matching, for candidate fingerprint template, minutiae points' original cartesian blocks are kept to be utilized in recovery process of the reed-solomon error erasure coding.
Reed-solomon Error Correction
Reed-solomon [10] is an error correction mechanism (erasure coding.) For a given input, it produces parity data, in a way that it can reproduce original input even if some parts are missing. Many modern storage systems, such as Linux RAID and Facebook's cold-storage utilize reed-solomon. Reedsolomon breaks the message into n equal pieces and constructs an input matrix, where n is the height of the matrix. Then, it generates a coding matrix of size n + k, k is being the number parity rows. First n rows of coding matrix has 1s in the diagonal and 0s for the rest of the matrix cells. The coded data is created by multiplying the coding matrix with the original matrix. Because of the diagonal 1s in the coding matrix, the first n rows of the coded data is the same as the original message, and the last k rows are parity. Thus, one row of the coding matrix generates a corresponding row of original data. Therefore, when some rows in the original message is missing, the corresponding rows in the coding matrix and the coded matrix are removed, and the matrix multiplication equation with the original data on the left side still remains valid. Later, inverse matrix of the new coding matrix is generated, and multiplied with the each side of the new equation. In the end, the original data matrix is produced on the left side of the equation. Figure 6 depicts an example of reed-solomon encoding of a given input Figure 6 : Example of reed-solomon encoding and decoding (adapted from [11] .) data of "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOP", and the reed-solomon decoding when "IJKLMNOP" is missing from the input data.
In our implementation, the hashes of the minutiae points is the input data. We perform reed-solomon mechanism per each of the pre-transformed cartesian blocks, having the hashes of the minutiae points as input data inside the blocks. By using the hashes of the minutiae points original minutiae points of original template are never revealed, a mechanism which preserves the privacy of the fingerprint owner. We also perform an overall reed-solomon implementation for all of the pre-transformed rectangular, having the resulting hash of each cartesian block as input data. This way we can recover the missing hashes of the minutiae points for each of the cartisian blocks. Consequently, we are able to calculate an overall hash of the fingerprint system that we utilize in the matching process. Overall hash is the symmetric key to be utilized in the symmetric encryption of owner's private key. Our goal is to regenerate the same key for the same person during the matching phase.
Matching
In the matching phase, we follow a number of steps to determine whether a given candidate fingerprint image produces the same overall hash value as with the original fingerprint image. The candidate fingerprint image goes through the same preprocessing and transformation steps as the original fingerprint image, as described in sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2. In the cartesian transformation, the same transformation parameters (boundaries and transformation matrix) are used as in the registration of the original fingerprint image. Moreover, in contrast to the registration phase, the original pretransformed cartesian block numbers are kept for the candidate fingerprint image.
The matching algorithm compares the transformed minutiae points of candidate fingerprint template with the transformed minutiae points of original fingerprint template. The comparison is done separately for each of the cartesian blocks. Geometrically closer minutiae points would be transformed to the same cartesian block in both original and candidate fingerprint template. Therefore, the minutiae points in cartesian block number x in the transformed candidate fingerprint template are only compared with the minutiae points in cartesian block number x in the transformed original fingerprint template. The comparison is done using the equality check of the minutiae point types, and the euclidean distance with a reasonable threshold. If a match found, the original cartesian block number of the minutiae point that belong to the candidate fingerprint template is used to reverse the transformation of the minutiae point that belong to the original fingerprint template. In this way, the original minutiae locations are recovered for the matched minutiae points.
The recovered minutiae points for each of the cartesian blocks are gone into the reed-solomon decoding process as explained in section 3.1.3, and a resulting hash is generated. If the generated hash is the same as the hash generated in the registration phase, then the fingerprint images match. Using this hash value and the same symmetric algorithm used in the encryption, encrypted private key is decrypted. Implementation code described in our method is available for research purposes 1 . 
Private Key Recovery
Cryptography in blockchain protocols are heavily based on public and private key pairs. Since public key is open to public, key recovery in distributed ledger technologies generally is about to private key recovery. Private key theft and lost are one of the major problems exist in blockchain systems. As explained in section 2.2.1, compromise of private key leads to losing ownership of the assets associated with the private key.
Recovery using Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme
According to Shamir's Secret Sharing (SSS) Scheme, data D is divided into n pieces, and k pieces of D can reconstruct D, but even k − 1 pieces reveals no information about D [12] . By using this method, owners can divide their secret into n pieces and distribute them to n different location. Even if some pieces are lost, any k pieces will be sufficient to recover the secret. SSS can be applied to recover a private key. In distributed digital identity systems, there are actors named as stewards. They are trusted nodes in network. Stewards' services can be used as distributed pieces' locations.
In our approach, we first create a symmetric key utilizing fingerprint data of owner, and we encrypt private key with the symmetric key as detailed in section 3.1. After encryption process, the encrypted output is split into n pieces, and each of the pieces are distributed to different and secure locations such as steward services. For recovery, any k of n pieces will be sufficient to recover the encrypted private key. After the encrypted private key was recovered, the same symmetric key is regenerated using fingerprint and used to decrypt the encrypted private key. The steps are depicted in Figure 7 .
Related Work
Selecting appropriate biometric data to create key pairs in decentralized digital blockchain identity is another issue that must be considered. Researchers have investigated several biometric features in biometric based cryptographic key generations [13] .
There are very few studies that integrate biometric traits into RSA keys. In his study, Je-Gyeong proposed a method for generating keys of digital signature (public and private key) from biometric. Some others investigated Iris texture as a biometric feature for generating cryptographic key. Rathgeb and Andreas proposed an approach using bits of the iris code for deriving biometric cryptographic key [14] . Janbandhu et.al derives signature keys from the code generated by using the 512 byte iris biometric data invented by the work done by J. Daugman [15] . Similarly, study by Boyen et al. also considers the iris texture as biometric trait [16] . In the study by Sarkar et. al, biometric authentication was used for obtaining asymmetric cryptography keys [17] .
Monrose et al. proposed a method using users' voice as biometric trait [18] . Their system regenerates the key from the user's voice by asking the user to repeat the same pass phrase. In the study by Chen and Chandran, the image of user's face was used in biometric key generation [19] . The same face image is required for regeneration of the key in the future.
In the paper of Perera et. al, they propose a new technique that combines digital signature with public key cryptography [20] . This new technique was implemented for RSA and ECC algorithms. In the study of Lan et al., the proposed algorithm was developed utilizing inner productions computation with error correction mechanism [21] .
In the study of Mjaaland et.al, public keys are extracted from users' fingerprints [22] . Another fingerprint that belong to the same user is processed to generate private keys. The method is resilient to the variations in the samples to generate the same resulting key.
Trotter proposes a fingerprint matching approach utilizing cartesian block transformation with reed-solomon erasure coding [23] . In his study, reedsolomon algorithm is performed on the entire original fingerprint template. Also, in the reed-solomon decoding process exact locations of the original minutiae points are recovered in contrast to our system in which we recover only the hash of the original minutiae points.
In the study of Kwon et al, they also propose a digital signature based on biometric data without holding them in hardware devices [24] . Studies that are done on biometric creation were underway many years due to the difficulties in achieving the uniformity of the biometric data from the noise. In the study [25] , they process biometric image first to provide the uniformity of the unstable biometric traits. In biometric cryptosystems, images of the biometric trait are taken and it is preprocessed. Then, using the preprocessed image, minutiae of the biometric are extracted. Later, the image minutiae points are transformed into a 1024 prime number generator to generate 2048 cryptographic key used in RSA chipper algorithm. In the study of Kayva et. al, they claimed that if the face recognition system for biometric affirmation is considered, then AES gives more sublime security than RSA and DES [26] . To avoid problems from occurring due to the certification authorities, identity based public key cryptography and certificate-less PKI was also proposed [27] . The communication phase between two peers has two phases. In the first phase (initialization phase), users produce public keys from biometric data. In the second phase (authentication and key agreement), they authenticates identities. Due to the nature of the blockchain, there are no authorities to keep the certification.
Security and privacy are major concerns in biometric based cryptography. Due to irrevocable nature of biometric traits, these systems must provide revocability [28] . As biometric data are inherent, they cannot be changed if compromised. Thus, in order to satisfy revocability of a generated key, biometric data must not be directly associated with the biometric properties. As shown in Figure 8 , Ratha et al. proposed a fingerprint image surface folding transformation approach that extract minutiae positions from fingerprint image and generates cancelable biometric templates. Since biometric templates are transformed, even when the data compromised, the original biometric data cannot cross-matched with biometric databases. Similarly, Barman et al. offered an approach using session-based biometric keys, meaning that another unique key should be generated in a new session using the same biometric data [29] .
In some studies, researchers explored applying more than one biometric traits instead of using only one biometric trait. Jagadeesan et al. proposed multimodal biometric system that generates a 256-bit secure cryptographic key using a combination of features from iris texture and minutiae points from the user's finger prints [13] . In the study of Manjunath et al., they propose multimodal approach of biometric. For instance they use Iris and Fingerprint, Speech and Signature, Face and Voice etc. In the study, Iris&fingerprint [30] modalities are used and evaluated under FAR, FRR and accuracy [31] . Also, the study conducted by Yik-Herng proposes multi modal biometric systems that combine iris and fingerprint with IFO hash fusion method [32] . Iris trait is unique for each individual even for identical twins. Also, false acceptance rate (FAR), the rate of invalid matches, is lower than all other biometric traits like fingerprint and face. Voice trait is a composite of both behavioral and physical biometrics. Behavioral part differentiates in time due to the factors like medical conditions and age. In contrast to token or passwordbased systems, biometric matching does not work well every time due to the false matching or false mismatching.
Bhattacharyya et al. provided a review on biometric authentication technologies [33] . They found that fingerprint based systems had 2% FAR and 2% false reject rate (FRR). On the other hand, face recognition system resulted in 1% FAR and 10% FRR. According to their study, Iris technologies achieved the best accuracy score in both FAR and FRR with 0.94% and 0.99%, respectively. Similarly, when the comparison between the biometric traits are gone through the study of Deborah et al., they claimed that iris recognition is the most suitable for mobile locking followed by fingerprint and face biometric data [34] . The results of the study of Yik-Herng et al.showed that although the proposed method yields better results than unimodal fingerprint biometric system, it does not perform as well as iris recognition system [31] . However, the proposed method contributes to the security aspect.
The study of Naser et al. also stated that indexing structure of iris surpass indexing structure of fingerprint. According to their study, in multi-modal approach, the hit rate was improved up to 99.8% from 97.0% and 98.3% respectively for fingerprint and indexing [35] . We can conclude that the iris biometric system appears to be slightly better in terms of accuracy than the other biometric systems in which the fingerprint comes close the most. Since asymmetric encryption (public key cryptography) is newer and more secure than symmetric encryption techniques, during this study asymmetric encryption techniques are used.
Smart card based biometric user authentication schemes have also been proposed [36] . The biometric data and keys are stored in a smart card for regeneration of keys in the future. However, smart card based approaches have portability issues as carrying physical card is an additional burden. Also if compromised, they pose security threats for biometric data. Fingerprint technology provides very accurate results [30] . Also, Jain et. al claimed that no biometric data is better than the other traits because all have own strengths and weaknesses, and performance of biometric data selection related with the type of application [37] . However, the matching accuracy of the fingerprint has been shown to be very high [38] .
Conclusion
Through blockchain implementations, the dominance of central authorities are reduced. While this is positive for reducing the cost of providing "trust" in the system, it increases the responsibility of the network participants on managing their keys. In blockchain, assets are locked to the public key of the asset owner, and can only be unlocked for spending with associated private key (asymmetric cryptography.) In this study, we focused on laying a foundation for securely encrypting and decrypting private keys used in controlling asset ownership in blockchain using a symmetric key generated from owner's fingerprint, and a distributed private key recovery system utilizing secret sharing scheme supported by biometric. We reviewed existing solutions in this domain, and described problems persists in traditional private key storage and recovery mechanisms in terms of security, usability and privacy. Our methodology includes the concepts of revocable fingerprints and erasure codes for key encryption, and distributed secret sharing scheme for key recovery. As for future work, we aim to integrate proposed solution on mobile applications with white-box cryptography.
